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"Deleuze/Parnet in Dialogues: The Folds of Post-Identity"

Charles J. Stivale

In 1977, a slim volume appeared in France co-authored by Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet entitled Dialogues. This dual authorship continued the well-known collaborative critical enterprise that Deleuze had initiated with Félix Guattari in Anti-Oedipus (1972) and that they subsequently pursued together in Kafka. Toward a Minor Literature (1975), Rhizome: Introduction (1976), A Thousand Plateaus (1980), and finally What Is Philosophy? (1991). In this essay, I propose to examine this collaborative enterprise in Dialogues in terms of a concerted strategy of thinking as post-identity. Deleuze famously emphasizes this process in his 1973 "Letter to a Harsh Critic" while describing his encounter with Guattari, "the way we understood and complemented, depersonalized and singularized—in short, loved—one another" [Negotiations 7]. Then, Deleuze and Guattari commence A Thousand Plateaus by stating: "The two of us wrote Anti-Oedipus together. Since each of us is several, there was already quite a crowd. . . . Why have we kept our own names [here]? Out of habit, purely out of habit. To make ourselves unrecognizable in turn. . . . To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I" [3].

In working through an image of thinking otherwise which would eliminate the importance of saying "I," Deleuze, Guattari, and Parnet create what I have elsewhere called distinct "folds of friendship." With this term, I refer to the manner in which contemporary post-World War Two French philosophers and writers—notably, Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault, and Blanchot, among others—seize upon extremely distant relationships to nourish their thought and thereby to maintain a vital, if dispersed, community of friends of thought.1 As Deleuze asserts in Negotiations, the intervention of such mediators, or intercesseurs, is necessary in order to facilitate the series of mutual resonances that contribute to thinking and writing otherwise, "to falsify[ing] established ideas," to enhancing the "capacities of falsity to produce truth" (Negotiations 125-126). This "truth" produced through falsification is a means to undermine established discursive boundaries and functions in concert with the subversion of fixed identities within intellectual exchange and creation.

In this essay, I assess the extent to which the authors achieve their enunciative goals in Dialogues. After reviewing the post-identitarian strategies introduced by Deleuze and Parnet in chapter one, I examine
how these strategies play out in the subsequent three chapters. Understanding the deployment of these post-identitarian strategies permits us, I believe, to outline an image of thinking otherwise. That is, we can grasp how these strategies infuse the Deleuze-Parnet author-ity with the becomings of many intercesseurs, mediators, thereby rendering the authorial persona, if not imperceptible, at least enunciated in multiplicity. Yet, these strategies also give rise to some paradoxes inherent to the traits that ultimately define the Deleuzian project in its broadest parameters: the folds of teaching and of friendship.

**Enunciating Dialogues**

The opening chapter, entitled "A Conversation: What Is It? What Is It For?," is marked textually by the authors' deliberate division of labor, Deleuze signing (with initials) the first part, Parnet the second. Despite these authorial marks, one would be hard pressed at first view to find significant discursive differences between the two sections of this chapter. It is as if the pedagogical exchange had so marked Parnet that her becomings lead inexorably toward (her own) imperceptibility, or that Deleuze's conceptual expression had somehow merged considerably with that of one of his most receptive students. However, despite the initial discursive resemblance, the methodological difference between Deleuze and Parnet emerges distinctly in the first chapter.

Deleuze emphasizes from the very start the importance of their practice-in-dialogue as one of many kinds of rencontres, encounters that are limited neither to face-to-face, real time interchange, nor in fact to interrelations between humans at all. The purpose of questions for him is not to provide answers, but rather "to get out, to get out of [the particular object of a question]," a process that would occur when least expected, "behind the thinker's back, or in the moment when he blinks" (Dialogues 3). Such movement can unfold only through "becomings," a series of which Deleuze traces in different media and styles, touching on topics that, in retrospect, are familiar within the Deleuzian oeuvre: writing as "stammer[ing] of language" (4), the "minor use of language" (4-5), the impersonal in writing (6). Here he says, "When you work, you are necessarily in absolute solitude . . . But it is an extremely populous solitude. Populated not with dreams, phantasms or plans, but with encounters [rencontres]" (6). These he equates with becomings, but not just any rencontres—with people, yes, "but also movements, ideas, events, entities," endowed with proper names, yet not necessarily designating a person or a subject. Rather, the name "designates an effect, a zigzag, something which passes or happens between two things as though under a potential difference" (6). This type of interchange is a "double capture," "between the two, outside the two, and which flows in another direction" (7), in short, a conversation.

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Then, moving to the domain of ideas, Deleuze asserts that *rencontres* arise through a particular method, "a pick-me-up or 'pick-up'—in the dictionary = collecting up, chance, restarting of the motor, getting on to the wavelength; and then the sexual connotation of the word" (10). Deleuze describes how he envisages such encounters with people, that is, with the "very varied lines" that constitute them, "a whole geography in people, with rigid lines, supple lines, lines of flight, etc." (10). He lists his friend Jean-Pierre; his wife, Fanny, with her ideas that "always seized me from behind"; Foucault with his "set of sounds hammered out, of decisive gestures, of ideas all made of tinder and fire, of deep attention and sudden closure, of laughter and smiles which one feels to be 'dangerous' at the very moment when one feels tenderness" (11); and Guattari, "a sort of wild rodeo, in part directed against himself" (11). Deleuze concludes this sequence with a telling phrase, "The desert, experimentation on oneself, is our only identity, our single chance for all combinations which inhabit us" (11). Still, he admits that this experimentation is, alas, stifled by "ordering these tribes [that populate the desert], arranging them in other ways, getting rid of some and encouraging others to prosper" (11).

As if to point out how this relative ordering (and stifling) unfolded in the "desert" of his life, Deleuze reflects on the steps of his career—his teachers (Ferdinand Alquié and Jean Hyppolite), the impact of Sartre on him and his contemporaries, his work on the history of philosophy (12-16). Returning to the importance of the *rencontre* with Guattari, Deleuze states that what mattered was "this strange fact of working between the two of us," referring back to others, pursuing their "pick-up method," with the result that "the desert expanded, but in so doing, became more populous" (17). To this approach, Deleuze attributes concepts such as the "body without organs" and the authors' use of the black hole plus white wall to create the concept of "faciality." Deleuze concludes by turning from the past to his present and future, to the "large book" he and Guattari were then finishing [*A Thousand Plateaus*], and, most immediately, to his *rencontre* with Parnet. He insists on the necessity of using the pick-up method "so that something is produced which doesn't belong to either of us, but is between 2, 3, 4 . . . n . . . [such that] 'Deleuze explains Guattari, signed you', 'x explains y, signed z'. Thus the conversation would become a real function" (19).

Following the initials G. D., part II begins with Parnet picking up, as it were, where Deleuze left off regarding the insufficiency of the Q & A procedure. She maintains that the very tone of questions tends to lock interviews and colloquia into binary machines, dualisms, either-or choices, thereby constituting a grid of inherent binaries that govern "the distribution of roles and which means that all the answers must go through preformed questions . . . Thus a grille is constituted such that everything
which does not pass through the grille cannot be materially understood" (20). Constituting a sustained reflection on binaries in psychoanalysis, in social and racial relations, in institutions, in linguistics, this stream brings Parnet to emphasize how Deleuze in his writings rejects "an image of thought that would impede thinking" (23). Instead, he shows how thought can "shake off its model, make its grass grow—even locally, even at the margins, imperceptibly" through his rencontres with different writers, such as Hume, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Proust, even Foucault. Says Parnet: "You did not treat them as authors, that is as objects of recognition, you found in them those acts of thought without image, blind as well as blinding, these violations, these encounters, these nuptials which make them creators well before they are authors" (24).

Yet, Deleuze still worked within the logic of binaries, she argues, in his history of philosophy phase (pre-1968) and even with Guattari, although with the quite different orientation of the rhizome vs. trees. After undertaking a lengthy summary of the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari think the multiplicity in their collaboration (mostly with reference to A Thousand Plateaus to which Parnet evidently was privy three years before its publication, 25-33), she challenges their assertion that they are attacking dualisms: "What are you doing if not proposing other dualisms? Acts of thought without image against the image of thought; rhizome or grass against the trees; the war-machine against the state-apparatus . . ." Parnet argues that language is inexorably locked into dualisms, and just by adding a third or a fourth term, one does not do away with the binary. Her alternative is to seek escape in the multiplicity inherent to the "AND, as something which has its place between the elements or between the sets. AND, AND, AND—stammering" (34). This constant proliferation of AND would allow one "to undo dualisms from the inside, by tracing the line of flight which passes between the two terms or the two sets . . . draw[ing] both into a non-parallel evolution, a heterochronous becoming" (35). Yet, the method that she proposes for the collaboration in Dialogues is, well, peculiarly binary: to divide each chapter in two, with no signatures "since it is between the two anonymous parts that the conversation would take place, and the AND Félix, AND Fanny, AND you, AND all those of whom we speak, AND me, would appear as so many distorted images in running water" (35). As we will see, though, Deleuze’s perspectives complement Parnet’s in seeking strategies of thinking otherwise that turn toward a collective assemblage of enunciation.

**Strategies of rencontres, Differences and Repetitions**

The student and her interlocutor thus appear to differ about the approach they are to follow subsequently since she seems to prefer a new direction, beyond what she perceived as the insufficiencies of the earlier
method. Yet, even Deleuze eschews the synthesis of critical reflections and concepts that he developed with Guattari in their first collaborative work, *Anti-Oedipus*, so that ultimately their differences are negligible.4

That is, Deleuze’s perspective encompasses the stammerings that Parnet extols within their variable, in-between modes of collective enunciation in the following chapters. Deleuze-Parnet proceed by a constant and deliberate displacement of the writers’ identities (with some exceptions in chapter 3 to which I return). As a result of this overlap and folding of thoughts and concepts shared by two interlocutors who are in fact a crowd, an in-between of thought comes to the fore through the folds of friendship, that is, through the resonances, differences, and repetitions available only within the intimacy of mediation.5

Furthermore, the initiation of this “dialogic becoming” lays the foundation for the discursive merging of their voices with those of other proximate interlocutors, notably Fanny Deleuze and Félix Guattari, as well as a whole chorus of others. One can argue, of course, that despite Deleuze and Parnet’s best-laid plans, the conceptual interplay of these *rencontres* does leave distinct authorial traces, notably from the contemporary collaboration of Deleuze with Guattari (in *Rhizome: Introduction* and *A Thousand Plateaus*). However, I would argue that the attentive reader can appreciate the creative potential unleashed through the deployment of these very repetitions in their differences, as a concerted effort to resist the need for attributing “I.”

The topic of chapter 2, “On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature,” presents a refreshingly different approach to French literature, especially from writers so deeply imbued with the national literary canon, and probably because of this very formation. Still emphasizing the importance of escape, of tracing a line of flight (the very strategy of *rencontres* introduced in chapter 1), they make the following distinction: whereas the French “are too fond of roots, trees, the survey, the points of arborescence, the properties” (structuralism serving as one example), for Anglo-American writers, “everything is departure, becoming, passage, leap, daemon, relationship with the outside . . . [creation of] a new Earth” (36-37). They then inveigh against the limitations of French writers—generally, the Oedipalizing impulsion to establish a little secret “on which the craze for interpretation feeds” (47).6 They also reject the French literary reduction of life “to something personal . . . in manifestos, in ideologies, in theories of writing, at the same time as in personal conflicts, in perfecting of perfectings, in neurotic toadying, in narcissistic tribunals” (49).

To this, they contrast a pantheon of Anglo-American writers along with selected Germanic writers such as Kleist, Kafka, and Hofmannsthal.7 Besides creating the lines of flight explicitly judged as so vital “to produce the real, to create life, to find a weapon” (49), the Anglo-Americans (and

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selected Germans) open writing to becomings, "the conjunction, the transmutation of fluxes, through which life escapes from the resentment of persons, societies and reigns" (50). Hardy's "heath-becoming," Miller's "grass-becoming," Woolf's passage "from one reign to another, from one element to another," all writing taken as "a love-letter: the literature-Real" (50-51)—these becomings all prepare the second section's emphasis on assemblages (\textit{agencements}) that the writer invents "starting from the assemblages which have invented him/her" [51-52]. This invention of assemblages entails "sympathy," understood as "the exertion or the penetration of bodies, . . . bodies who love and hate each other, each time with populations in play, in these bodies or on these bodies" (52). In this way, the writer finds in becoming a means of "loving without alcohol, drugs and madness, becoming-sober for a life which is richer and richer. This is sympathy, assembling. Making one's bed, the opposite of making a career, being neither simulator of identifications nor the frigid doctor of distances" (53-54).

Deleuze and Parnet introduce a "rule of these conversations" here: "the longer a paragraph, the more it is suited to being read very quickly," and the repetition of examples would also accelerate the text, transforming it into a "ritornello" (translated in \textit{A Thousand Plateaus} as "refrain," plateau 11). In order to offer examples (in theory, at least) of this speedy writing/reading, the second part moves faster, first, with three distinct subdivisions—"On Empiricism" (three long paragraphs), "On Spinoza" [two long paragraphs], and "On the Stoics" [two long paragraphs]—then, with an untitled final section that moves in zigzag fashion. That is, the paragraphs veer between topics, on contemporary science and then on humor and irony (66-69), toward a final reflection on assemblages and their "sympathies," their alliances in terms of technology, their composition as utterances and machines, and their diachronic relation to territoriality (69-74). The final long paragraph (read faster!) returns to writing as becoming, tracing flights, the goal being "to release what can be saved from life, . . . to release from becoming that which will not permit itself to be fixed in a term. A strange ecology, tracing a line of writing, music or painting" (75). In short, one would write "only for illiterates, for those who do not read or at least for those who will not read you" as well as for animals. The purpose is not to make them speak, but "writing as a rat traces a line, or as it twists its tail, as a bird sends out a sound, as a cat moves or else sleeps heavily. Animal-becoming, on condition that the animal, rat, horse, bird or cat, itself becomes something else, bloc, line, sound, colour of sand—an abstract line. For everything which changes, passes along that line: assemblage" (75).

In this way, Deleuze-Parnet reorient writing away from the canonical and hierarchized stricutures of the personal, the secret, the neuroses and
limited territories attributed to the French literary canon. This bold and innovative stance intersects clearly with what Deleuze and Guattari already had published in *Rhizome: Introduction* (1976) and lays the ground for (indeed, is evidently in symbiotic relation to) *A Thousand Plateaus.*

The subsequent chapters in *Dialogues* introduce variations on these same enunciative strategies as a mode of becoming—the becoming-in-dialogue between Deleuze-Parnet and the crowd of articulations that they channel and assemble, and the becoming of a broader reflection that takes a repeated, yet different shape in *A Thousand Plateaus.*

However, in each chapter, the text moves along significantly different paths in attempting to fulfill the goals enunciated in the opening chapter. In chapter 3, "Dead Psychoanalysis: Analyze," an important detail in the enunciation is evident from the start, the repeated use of the pronoun "we," creating a distinct pleat in the aforementioned strategies. Whereas one might assume that Deleuze-Parnet have merged into one, this "we" evidently corresponds also to Deleuze and Guattari since the references are to their attack on psychoanalysis in *Anti-Oedipus.* These references constitute at once a review of their earlier critique and also its extension, along the lines followed in *A Thousand Plateaus,* away from the insistence on "desiring machine" and toward the importance of assemblages, fluxes, and particular relations of movement and rest (see 101-102).

After reviewing the strategies through which psychoanalysis seeks to regulate assemblages of desire and of enunciation (82-89), the authors attribute enunciative agency quite specifically in different and more narrow ways. First, they maintain quite openly: "We have been credited with many blunders about the *Anti-Oedipus* . . . They did not come from us . . . What we tried to show, on the contrary, was how desire was beyond these personological or objectal coordinates" (89). These sentences announce the shift toward the definition of two planes—of immanence and of consistency—and then to the productive, yet difficult concept of *haecceities,* the "thisness" of the event (90-94). Furthermore, by attributing the "Schumann-assemblage" explicitly to Guattari's influence (98-102), the enunciative "we" creates a bridge to the chapter's second section and its discussion of language and desire, both in terms of different regimes of signs (see *A Thousand Plateaus,* plateau 5) and different pragmatics of linguistics (see *A Thousand Plateaus,* plateau 4). Here the chapter title becomes more comprehensible: rendered in telegraphic style, the words "psychanalyse morte analysez" (without insertion of colon as in the English version) translate as "[while the project of] psychoanalysis [is] dead [, just remember this:] analyze. The two planes, regimes of signs, pragmatics, and a little help from friends all help assemble the analytical process." And succumbing to the importance of this analytical imperative, the "we" finally yields at the chapter's end to a specific "I" in a "Note by D. G." His purpose is to
outline three points for establishing the critical as equal to the clinical, and in doing so, he insists on the importance of "regimes of signs" for his earlier work on Sacher-Masoch, Proust, and Lewis Carroll, and especially for his 1975 (thus, most recent) collaboration with Guattari on Kafka (119-123).11

Chapter 4, entitled "Many Politics" (simply "Politiques" in French), gives us another way to appreciate how the original enunciative goals are at once re-established and revised. For the reader familiar with A Thousand Plateaus cannot escape noticing the continuing overlap of many of the sections in chapter 4 with various segments in A Thousand Plateaus.12 We also witness a moment in the midst of a powerful cautionary reflection on schizophrenia and les marginaux in which G. D. feels compelled to intervene momentarily in his own voice.13 However, this final chapter reveals fully how the strategies of enunciation outlined at the start contribute to a novel mode of identitarian practice. A way to conceptualize this practice is with reference to Brian Massumi's advice for reading A Thousand Plateaus (which he translated for publication in 1987) as a kind of sampling, skipping via different themes, passages, or links from one plateau to another.14 This reading would correspond roughly to the method that Deleuze designates in Dialogues as "pick-up," as if the stylus or cursor could jump through crosscutting from one conceptual flow to another.15 Another Deleuzian term that would translate this approach is "zigzag," and while Deleuze may feel that he and Guattari did not achieve the Pop Philosophy of which they initially dreamed in Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze-Parnet et al. henceforth move their writing/reading/thinking practices into an innovative practice of discursive "zigzag."16 The plethora of themes and concepts evoked here, I maintain, constitutes an initial collective assemblage of enunciation for work that will take much more developed form in an entirely complex and differently documented mix.

We can thus understand the dual paradoxes inherent to this approach. After the opening chapter (and even within it), this work purports to free itself of the unified authorial voice or, at least, to pluralize its voices and thereby to create a discourse entre-deux, between and among several interlocutors. And it would seem that both Deleuze and Parnet have their ways in expanding this exercise of enunciative plurality. Yet, Dialogues contains some quite distinctive authorial traces that can be linked, as I have noted, to various lines of thought and conceptual developments specific to Deleuze alone and to his work with different collaborators. These traces become all the more evident when we read Dialogues in light of the 1988-89 L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze [Deleuze's ABC Primer]. This later interview helps us envisage the second paradox: despite the apparent search for authorial multiplicity and imperceptibility, Dialogues and L’Abécédaire are at once a series of pedagogical exercises and extensive

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manifestations of friendship relying on the individual, teacher-student, or interpersonal relationship rather than on a free-floating agency and inarticulate mode of rapport.

Still, these paradoxes do nothing to diminish the force—understood as *puissance de vie* or power of life—that results from the proliferation of concepts and the collective assemblages into which these concepts enter. *Dialogues* is a multifaceted laboratory, the kind of life-experimentation to which Deleuze gave greater and greater emphasis in his later years. Moreover, the exchange also sets into motion or further propels the conceptual zigzag that characterized Deleuze's work over the next decade—on art, film, friendship, and folds—and beyond, to philosophy as a question, to the critical and clinical, and on to the final essay that appeared two months before his death by suicide, "Immanence: A Life." Finally, this interchange between teacher-student as well as the assemblage to which their exchange gives voice not only help reverse and scramble the hierarchical rapport, that is, of just who is teaching and learning. Through this very process of authorial "becoming-imperceptible," Deleuze and Parnet also implicitly emphasize the importance of pedagogy and friendship, and indeed of pedagogy as friendship. As Deleuze's former student at Vincennes, Parnet collaborates with Deleuze through *Dialogues* as an *intercesseur*, first helping to initiate the in-between of their mediation through dialogue, then participating in the becoming-imperceptible that defines the post-identitarian mode of thinking otherwise.

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Notes

1. See Stivale, "Folds." On friendship and pedagogy, see Stivale, *Two-Fold Thought*; on friendship as themes and practice among these writers and their contemporaries, see Kaufman.

2. These concepts traverse Deleuze's works, with Guattari and on his own, and are most clearly articulated for the literary domain in *Essays Critical and Clinical*.

3. These references correspond, respectively, to Deleuze's *Empiricism and Subjectivity* [on Hume], *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, Nietzsche and Philosophy*, and *Proust and Signs*, and two early essays on Foucault published in *Critique* (issues 274 [1970] and 343 [1975]) that were republished with considerable revision as the first two chapters of *Foucault* [1986], respectively as "A New Archivist (The Archaeology of Knowledge)" and "A New Cartographer (Discipline and Punish)."

4. As Deleuze says in his 1973 "Letter to a Harsh Critic" [Michel Cressole], republished in *Pourparlers*, "We wouldn't of course claim that *Anti-Oedipus* is completely free of any scholarly apparatus: it's pretty academic, pretty serious, and it's not the Pop Philosophy or Pop Analysis we dreamed of" [Negotiations 7]. Furthermore, a response to Parnet's critique emerges in chapter 4 ("Many Politics") in the form of their merged voices and in the context of political becomings: "What defines dualism is not the number of terms, any more than one escapes from dualism by

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adding other terms (x 2) . . . We do not therefore speak of a dualism between two kinds of 'things,' but of a multiplicity of dimensions, of lines and directions in the heart of an assemblage" [132-133].

5. These resonances and overlaps are, in many ways, a practical extension of Deleuze's extremely important and original book on Difference and Repetition.

6. They specifically single out Maurice Sachs as a "pathetic case" (44) and Bataille who "made the little secret the essence of literature" (47).

7. This pantheon includes "Thomas Hardy, Melville, Stevenson, Virginia Woolf, Thomas Wolfe, [D.H.] Lawrence, Fitzgerald, Miller, Kerouac" (36), and later Henry James (49), Lewis Carroll (49; see also Deleuze's The Logic of Sense), Castaneda (48), and Stephen Crane (64).

8. Without undertaking a parsing exercise, one notes overlaps in chapter 2 with Deleuze and Guattari's developments in A Thousand Plateaus on black holes and faciality (plateau 7), on the novella (plateau 8), on territories and expression (plateau 9), on the whole panorama of becomings explored serially in plateau 10, "Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible . . . ," and in plateau 12, on the War-Machine.

9. See also plateau 10, A Thousand Plateaus, 260-272, 298-300; examples in both texts are drawn from Woolf and Proust, Boulez and John Cage, and Hölderlin-Kleist-Nietzsche. On the "thisness" of the dance event in Cajun music, see Stivale, Disenchancing Les Bons Temps, chapter 4.

10. Deleuze's wife Fanny receives an explicit "homage" for assisting with the example of the anorexic body in relation to assemblages of desire and enunciation, "specifically anorexic elegance, Fanny's trinity: Virginia Woolf, Murnau, Kay Kendall" (109-110).

11. Besides to Proust and Signs, the references to Sacher-Masoch and Lewis Carroll correspond, respectively, to Deleuze's Masochism. Coldness and Cruelty and The Logic of Sense.

12. For example, the opening segment on different forms of segmentation (124-131) clearly will become plateau 8 on the "novella," with the analyses of Fitzgerald's "The Crack-Up" and Fleutieaux's "The Story of the Abyss and the Spyglass" supplemented by Henry James's "The Cage." Other overlaps lie in the different reference texts from which Deleuze and Guattari draw in A Thousand Plateaus and within the conceptual frameworks in which these texts are deployed.

13. Following the sentences "Marginals have always inspired fear in us, and a slight horror. They are not clandestine enough," Deleuze alone interjects: "NOTE: In any case, they scare me. There is a molecular speech of madness, or of the drug addict or the delinquent in vivo which is no more valid that [sic] the great discourses of a psychiatrist in vitro. There is as much self-assurance on the former's part as certainty on the latter's part. It is not the marginals who create the lines; they install themselves on these lines and make them their property, and this is fine
when they have that strange modesty of men of the line, the prudence of the experimenter, but it is a disaster when they slip into a black hole from which they no longer utter anything but the micro-fascist speech of their dependency and their giddiness: 'We are the avant-garde,' 'We are the marginals'" [139].

14. Massumi says: "How should A Thousand Plateaus be played? When you buy a record there are always cuts that leave you cold. You skip them. You don't approach a record as a closed book that you have to take or leave. Other cuts you may listen to over and over again. They follow you. You find yourself humming them under your breath as you go about your daily business. A Thousand Plateaus is conceived as an open system. It does not pretend to have the final word. The authors' hope, however, is that elements of it will stay with a certain number of its readers and will weave into the melody of their everyday lives" [A Thousand Plateaus xiii-xiv].

15. In preparing to introduce the fundamental importance of mediators for the creative process in Negotiations, Deleuze provides a number of examples that recall this cross-cutting practice, the most notable one drawn from Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, "the baker's transformation" [Negotiations 124]. Deleuze concludes: "Thus philosophy, art, and science come into relations of mutual transformation and exchange, but always for internal reasons. The way they impinge on one another depends on their own evolution. So in this sense we really have to see philosophy, art, and science as sorts of separate melodic lines in constant interplay with one another" [125].

16. A decade later, Deleuze and Parnet concluded their eight-hour video interview, L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze [Deleuze's ABC Primer] with the letter "Z as in Zigzag." For a summary of this final discussion, see http://www.langlab.wayne.edu/CStivale/D-G/ABC3.html. Besides "zigzag" [Dialogues 6-7], L'Abécédaire picks up and extends many themes already introduced a decade earlier, most notably (and alphabetically): assemblages (51-54, 62-74, 132-134), critical and clinical (119-123), desire and Anti-Oedipus (89-91), desire and Freud (77-82), desire and haecceities (91-103), desire and semiotic regimes (103-119), friendship (8-11, 16-18), history of philosophy (13-16), ideas and "schools" of thought (23-28), joy-sadness (59-62), literature (36-76), psychoanalysis (77-89), speeds (30-33), territories and the State (135-147), and writing (43-51, 74-76).

Works Cited


